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“There is one universal truth, applicable to all countries, cultures and communities:
violence against women is never acceptable, never excusable, never tolerable.”
United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon 1
1At the Commision on the Status of Women, New York, 25 February 2008.
Summary
Violence against women is one of the most pervasive forms of human rights violations
worldwide. Over one third of all women have been beaten, forced into sex, or otherwise
abused in their lifetime. Despite this, violence against women has only in later years
been recognized internationally as a threat to the health and rights of women as well as
to national development. Scientific research on the problem of domestic violence is also
a relatively recent undertaking and has mainly focused on Western countries.
Given the extent and consequences of violence against women, it is urgent to identify
strategies for action to reduce the violence. The current study uses a cross-sectional
household survey from Peru to examine whether female ownership of land affects the
prevalence of physical violence against women. According to economic bargaining theory,
transfer of land from a husband to his wife will empower the woman, as an increase in
the female relative share of land within the household will raise her threat point and
thus her bargaining position within the household. This is in turn theorized to affect
the level of violence in the family, as a more economically independent woman has a
superior outside option and stands in a better position to negotiate a more favourable
outcome for herself.
To be able to make causal inference, not only measure a correlation, I make use of an
exogenous change in land tenure which increased the share of land for only a subset of the
women in my sample. A historical coincidence made only certain communities in Peru
eligible for a land-titling program, and it was thus only women in these communities
who received an increased share of land. While the state initiated land-titling program’s
aim was to formalize already existing property rights on land, the formalization process
additionally ended up contributing to a higher degree of gender equality in the areas it
was conducted. The reason being that joint title between the man and the woman in
the household was the default option when the parcels were titled, and a legal argument
was required for parcels to be titled otherwise. The Peruvian Civil Code state that land
acquired during marriage shall be jointly owned, while inherited land, either prior to
or during marriage, belongs to the recipient. As men are traditionally favoured in the
heritage practice, the land-titling program with joint title on all land as the default option
thus implied a transfer of capital from the man to the woman within the household. As
the historical event which led to the distinction between communities which were eligible
for the land titling program resembles a random, natural experiment, i. e. it is assumed
independent of characteristics on community and household level that might affect a
woman’s empowerment, the difference in the prevalence of domestic abuse between the
two types of communities is solely due to the empowerment impact of joint titling.
To obtain my result, I estimate a model with a bivariate dependent variable, taking
the value 1 if the woman in the household has ever suffered from physical abuse by
her husband and 0 otherwise. As the causal relationship of interest is the effect of
increased female landholdings on domestic violence, I include a dummy for whether the
community was eligible for the formalization of property rights in the model. Since the
assignment of community type and the following land titling program was a random
process, selection bias is eliminated, and the treatment variable is to be considered
as exogenous. Considering the bivariate nature of the dependent variable, I chose the
logistic regression method. The estimates are obtained by using the statistical software
package STATA 13.
I find the impact on the probability of ever having been physically abused to be 7,9%
lower in the communities where the land-titling program was conducted - significant on
a 1% level. In the communities where women have been empowered through greater
ownership of land, leading to a higher threat point and thereby bargaining power within
the household, there is less abuse. Both reduction of gender-based violence and increase
of female land owners are part of the UN’s platform for action to strengthen gender
equality and reduce poverty. The interpretation of my result, I argue, is that these two
strategies are interrelated - empowering women through greater ownership of land may
reduce domestic abuse.
Previous studies conducted on the link between female land ownership and the level of
domestic abuse has, to my knowledge, only made use of non-experimental data, and
their findings may be nothing more than a spurious correlation. This thesis thus stands
out for two reasons; the data is from a non-Western country, and it makes use of an
exogenous change in land distribution between man and woman in certain Peruvian
communities, which resembles a natural experiment, to identify the causal effect of
female land ownership on domestic abuse.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Violence against women is one of the most pervasive forms of human rights violations
worldwide. Over one third of all women have been beaten, forced into sex, or otherwise
abused in their lifetime - and the abuser is usually a family member or someone otherwise
known to them [World Health Organization, 2013]. Despite this, violence against women
has only in later years been recognized internationally as a threat to the health and
rights of women as well as to national development. Scientific research on the problem
of domestic violence is also a relatively recent undertaking and has mainly focused on
Western countries.
Given the extent and consequences of violence against women, it is urgent to identify
strategies for action to reduce the violence. The current study uses a cross-sectional
household survey from Peru to examine whether female ownership of land affects the
prevalence of physical violence against women. According to economic bargaining theory,
transfer of land from a husband to his wife will empower the woman, as an increase in
the female relative share of land within the household will raise her threat point and
thus her bargaining position within the household. This is in turn theorized to affect
the level of violence in the family, as a more economically independent woman has a
superior outside option and stands in a better position to negotiate a more favourable
outcome for herself.
Surveys conducted in rural Nicaragua has found that female land ownership opposes
traditional gender ideology and strengthens women’s power and control within marriage,
and thereby reduces the level of violence [Grabe, 2010]. Another study from Kerala, India
1
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support the same relationship between land ownership and spousal abuse [Panda and
Agarwal, 2005]. Yet, the link between female land ownership and the level of domestic
violence may be nothing more than a spurious correlation in these studies, as they both
make use of non-experimental data.
To be able to make causal inference, not only measure a correlation, I make use of an
exogenous change in land tenure which increased the share of land for only a subset of
the women in my sample. A historical coincidence made only certain communities in
Peru eligible for a land-titling program, and it was thus only women in these commu-
nities who received an increased share of land. The historical event which led to the
division between communities resembles a random, natural experiment based on certain
assumptions elaborated in Chapter 2.
While the state initiated land-titling program’s aim was to formalize already existing
property rights on land, the formalization process additionally ended up contributing
to a higher degree of gender equality in the areas it was conducted [Wiig, 2013]. The
reason being that joint title between the man and the woman in the household was
the default option when the parcels were titled, and a legal argument was required for
parcels to be titled otherwise. The Peruvian Civil Code state that land acquired during
marriage shall be jointly owned, while inherited land, either prior to or during marriage,
belongs to the recipient. As men are traditionally favoured in the heritage practice, the
land-titling program with joint title on all land as the default option thus implied a
transfer of capital from the man to the woman within the household.
To study the effect of female land ownership on domestic abuse I will compare areas that
formalized property rights and indirectly empowered women to areas that were exempt
from the titling process. My study thus stands out for two reasons; it uses data from a
non-Western country, and the exogenous change in the distribution of land between the
spouses represents a unique opportunity to test the causal effect of female land holdings
on the likelihood to experience domestic violence.
I estimate a model with a bivariate dependent variable, taking the value 1 if the woman
in the household has ever suffered from physical abuse by her husband and 0 otherwise.
As the causal relationship of interest is the effect of increased female landholdings on
domestic violence, I use a dummy for whether the community was eligible for the for-
malization of property rights to identify this. Since the assignment of community type
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and the following land titling program was a random process, it eliminates any selection
bias, and the treatment variable is to be considered as exogenous. In addition, I include
a number of other independent variables to reduce the probability that the effect of
the treatment variable is contaminated by other factors, as well as to get a more precise
estimate. Considering the bivariate nature of the dependent variable, I chose the logistic
regression method.
I find the impact on the probability of ever having been physically abused to be 7,9%
lower in the communities where the land-titling program was conducted - significant on
a 1% level. Where women have been empowered through greater ownership of land,
leading to a higher threat point and thereby bargaining power within the household,
there is less abuse. Both reduction of gender-based violence and increase of female land
owners are part of the UN’s platform for action to strengthen gender equality and reduce
poverty. The evidence from this study suggests that empowering women through greater
ownership of land may reduce domestic abuse.
The dataset only allowed me to look at whether or not the woman had been physically
abused by her husband, and not the level of abuse. Since I found that considerably
fewer women had ever been abused in the communities where women own more land, it
is thus not unlikely that the level of abuse among the women who still were beaten by
their husbands in these communities also were affected.
The paper is organized as follows; Chapter 2 gives an introduction to the contextual
framework around gender, the history of land and violence in Peru. In Chapter 3 I
present theory and literature on household behavior in relation to distribution of welfare
within the household, empowerment of women and violence, as well as empirical evidence
of the different economic theories which seek to explain domestic abuse. Chapter 4
describes the data, presents the sample statistics, and outlines my estimation strategy
and econometric approach. The results from my estimation of the model are presented
in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 I come with some concluding remarks.
Chapter 2
Gender, Land and Violence
in Peru
2.1 The Andean Household
The small-scale peasant household is the basic institution in the Andean economy, some-
thing which makes it hard to draw the line between the producing unit and the household
itself [Mayer, 2002, p. 1]. As a result of this, the husband and the wife are viewed as
complementary to each other, rather than one being subordinated to the other, because
each of them has an essential role in the household production [Mayer, 2002, p. 12].
The division of labour does however follow traditional gender roles. The man is usually
in charge of the productive tasks, while the woman is responsible for administering the
resources, taking care of the children and making food. The woman also manages the
day-to-day purchases, but el gasto, i. e. the allowance to purchase basic necessities, is
given to her by her husband [Mayer, 2002, p. 11].
On the other hand, if the man is to leave for a shorter period, e. g. to seek work in
urban areas, or to fulfill minka, or ayni obligations somewhere else,1 there are no social
barriers for a woman to take over his role as a farmer. In fact, all nonnuclear families
are run by women, as a woman can easily get male help for productive tasks, while it
1Minka and ayni are old, Andean traditions of collective work. The former is related to collective
work for the common good, while the latter concern individual action, a mutual help to other households
[Mayer, 2002, Chap. 4]
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is said that a man cannot live alone as he would have no one to cook for him [Mayer,
2002, p. 7].
Although the man is seen as the main agriculturalist and the woman only as an assistant,
it does not necessarily reflect their actual contributions. In fact, a study from the Andes
shows that rural women dedicate more time to agricultural production than men [Deere,
2005]. Yet, given that the women’s main responsibility lies within the domestic sphere,
they are primarily viewed as helpers in the agricultural production, and the custom
has been to favor men in the inheritance practice, while the women get access to land
through their husband when they marry [Deere and Leon, 2001, p. 7] . Women’s access
to land is thus largely determined by their marital relationship. Furthermore, an article
by Deere and Leon [2003] on women’s ownership of assets in Latin America shows that
women do not only own less land, but the land they do possess is both smaller and
of poorer quality. The same study also demonstrates that, although men are usually
favoured when it comes to the inheritance of land, it is nevertheless the most important
way a woman acquire land.
2.2 Gender Roles in the Society
The gender roles throughout the Latin American continent are often characterized with
words such as machismo and marianismo. ”Machismo is related to the social domination
and privilege that men have over women in economic, legal, judicial, political, cultural
and psychological spheres. Ideas about machismo can be explicit or not; however, they
contribute to discrimination against women. Boys typically grow up learning that they
are strong and can obtain their goals by being aggressive [Cianelli et al., 2008, p. 298].
Marianismo describes the ideal for the women. They are supposed to be submissive,
good wives and mothers and respectful and dependent on men [Cianelli et al., 2008, p.
299]. So, although the husband and the wife are viewed as complementary to each other
within the household’s agricultural production, this is not necessarily the case in the
wider social sphere.
Women’s marginalized status and subordination in the social sphere has a long history
in Peru. In addition to be prevalent in the unequal division of land, women dress in
traditional customs, while men are not required to follow any particular dress code - a
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practice that reinforces women as a carrier of tradition, while men are allowed to have
greater flexibilities [Deere, 1990, p. 311]. The high percentage of the female population
who are monolingual Quechua-speakers and the lower proportion of women who can
read and write compared to men also underpin women’s lower position in the society. In
the sample I make use of in this thesis, 20% of the women only speak a native language,
compared to 8% for the men. When it comes to the illiteracy rate, 36% of the women
do not read or write, while the number is only 13% for the men.
Moreover, women have always been underrepresented in the Peruvian political arena.
They were not granted the right to vote until 1955, and it took additionally 30 years until
the legal capacity of married women were recognized and gender equality in household
representation and management was established [Deere and Leon, 2001, p. 43, 47].
Today, women account for 22 % of Peruvian elected officials, however there is great
variation between levels and positions, with for instance only 3% of the mayors being
women [Htun, 2005].
The difference in access to economic and social resources between women and men
is an important determinant of the prevalence of the gender inequality in Peru. The
labour division between men and women in the agriculture production legitimatizes and
reinforces the unequal status of gender in the wider social sphere. This is supported
by a study which compared gender roles in Peru between urban and rural areas [Kang,
2010]. Gender roles which confines women’s mobility to the domestic sphere are more
prevalent in the countryside compared to urban areas. The author claims that it is due
to the greater presence of agriculture production in rural areas which induces this.
The internal distribution of land in the peasant communities is still governed by tra-
ditional customs and practices, and the distribution of land is thus highly unequally
divided between men and women. Bourque and Warren [1981]’s comparative analysis
of two Andean communities offers an important point of reference on the implication of
this. After comparing gender ideology and division of labor in the commercial center
of Chiuchin and the agricultural village of Mayobamba, Bourque and Warren observe,
in line with Kang [2010] above, that while women in both places are affected by gen-
der hierarchy and restrictions from gender role stereotyping, the women in the urban
Chiuchin have higher status. Better accessibility to capital and less responsibility which
confines them to the domestic sphere, enables them to achieve higher social status with
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less mediation from their husbands or male family members compared to the peasant
women in Mayobamba. An important lesson from both of the studies presented here,
is that women’s access to, or ownership of resources, may be an essential element in
altering the strict gender roles which characterize the Peruvian society.
2.3 The Prevelance of Domestic Violence
Still, the gains in Peru over the past 40 years related to the improvement of women’s
status have been multiple; higher political participation, more women in education and
professional employment, increased institutional responses to specific problems by a
series of state-institutions such as the Ministry for Women and Social Development,
police stations just for women and support to different women’s organization [Boesten,
2009]. But as argued in the previous section, the country is far from gender equal and
faces a number of challenges. One of the most persistent challenges to equality - or one
of the mechanisms that maintain inequality - is violence against women. The proportion
of ever-married women, who report spousal violence in Peru, is one of the highest on
the Latin American continent [Pan American Health Organization, 2013].
The multicountry study on women’s health and domestic violence against women, spon-
sored by the World Health Organization, collected data from Peru among others between
2000 and 2003 [Garc´ıa-Moreno et al., 2005]. This comprehensive study reports that 49%
of ever-partnered women in Lima and 61% in Cusco have experienced physical violence
by a partner at some time in their life. For sexual violence by a partner, these percent-
ages were 23% in Lima and 47% in Cusco. Together 51% of ever-partnered women in
Lima and 69% in Cusco have experienced physical or sexual violence by a partner.
The same study reports that despite the high prevalence of domestic violence, one third
of the women in Lima and Cusco had never told anyone about the physical violence
inflicted by their partner, and only about one third of the women who had experienced
physical violence by a partner had sought help from a service provider. The reason for
not seeking help was for over one quarter of the women because the violence either was
“normal” or not serious, while 15% in Lima and 28% in Cusco reported not seeking help
because they felt shame or thought they would not be believed.
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The high occurrence of spousal abuse in Peru is not surprising according to the culture
of violence hypothesis, which theorize that a society with a more violent history, is more
likely than a society with a nonviolent history, to permit domestic violence [Wolfgang
and Ferracuti, 1967]. Where violence has been used for solving conflicts in a country, it
is more likely to be accepted as a way of solving conflicts between parties in a household.
Beginning with the Spanish invasion in 1532 and extending to its recent conflict with the
Shining Path guerilla organization, Peru has had several violent events throughout its
history. In addition, McWilliams’ version of the theory emphasizes that general violence
in the society blocks public awareness about issues of domestic violence [McWilliams
and McKiernan, 1993]. This also supports the probability of observing higher rates of
domestic violence in a (previously) violent society.
In recent years, the public attention on the issue of domestic violence has increased
markedly in Peru. The country was among the first in Latin America to adopt spe-
cial legislation on domestic violence; The Law for Protection from Family Violence was
implemented in 1993 and later strengthened in 1997 [Human Rights Watch, 2010]. In
addition, women’s police stations and centers for victims of violence have been put up.
On the other hand, the implementation of the laws has proved to be challenging on
several levels. Human Rights Watch [2010] report that due to the partial justice system,
the unresponsiveness and inefficiency of the police, the often inattentive medical exami-
nations and because state judges seem to consider domestic violence to be insufficiently
serious to warrant punishment of perpetrators, Peruvian women are still at high risk of
experiencing domestic violence.
2.4 The History of Land
Since I will make use of historical events in the Peruvian land practice throughout the
20th century to argue for a random assignment of communities into two legal types, the
story of Peru’s land management is of fundamental importance for my thesis. The first
real effort to redistribute land in Peru, after the Spanish colonization, was made by Juan
Velasco Alvarado. He came to power by a coup in 1968, and Peru had a de facto leader in
uniform. This was not the first time, but unlike his predecessors, Velasco saw himself as
a voice for the poor [Mayer, 2009, p. 3]. He carried out several reforms and among them
an agrarian reform in 1969, which was to reverse the unequal distribution of land which
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had accumulated under Spanish rule and the subsequent encomienda system. Above
all, Velasco’s regime is remembered for this reform, as it is still considered as Latin
America’s most radical agrarian reform [Mayer, 2009, p. 2].
The haciendas, most of them which belonged to the old, Peruvian elite, were expropri-
ated and transformed into peasant cooperatives. However, the cooperatives eventually
dissolved one by one, and formed peasant communities instead. The communities were
groups of small-scale peasant households within a geographical boundary with certain
collective institutions. Over time, some of these communities got the legal status as
recognized peasant communities (CCR) where common property right to land was es-
tablished, while others got other legal statuses, or none. I follow the practice of the
PeruLandGender project and denote the ones who remained without any legal status
as private communities (CP).2 These were the ones who later became eligible for the
titling program in the 90s, which sought to individualize and formalize property rights.
The process that led certain communities to be recognized as peasant communities, while
some remained without any status, is postulated to be random. As Mayer [2009, p. 28-
29] put it: ”most traditional feudal haciendas dissolved fairly rapidly into de facto and
sometimes officially recognized indigenous communities (CCR) without much fanfare
or official notice”. The labeling of the communities, rather than relying on different
community criteria, was often decided by the idiosyncratic decisions of the local land
reform director. The claim by Mayer [2002] and Wiig [2013] is that, in addition to
the random labeling of communities, this formal status did not successively lead to
any changes in how the households administered their resources, as this is considered a
private matter - not something the community assembly interferes in.
The households were viewed as independent units with individual land rights in both
types of communities, and neither community authorities nor the members themselves
differentiated much between the two types over the years. It was not until the mid-
90s, when a land-titling program was initiated by the state, that the legal status of
the communities started to matter. The program sought to formalize and individualize
land on the background of the economic efficiency argument [Wiig, 2013, p. 104]; well-
defined property rights stimulate investments, as the investor will be guaranteed to
2The PeruLandGender project financed by the Norwegian Research Council grant, # 196328, which
conducted the questionnaire survey used in this master thesis, is a research project beneath the Inter-
national Section of the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research.
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reap the benefits of the investment. However, the titling initiative was only possible
to conduct in the private communities, as the recognized peasant communities formally
had defined property rights on the land, with one deed covering the whole community.
The election of communities where land was to be titled individually was random, or in
other words, free of selection bias. To further strengthen Peru’s land management as
a natural experiment, the process which formalized the land should also satisfy certain
criteria, as noted in Wiig [2013]. First, the titling agency, PETT, later under the name
COFOPRI, respected the legal status of the communities [Wiig, 2013, p. 108]. Though
some officers have admitted that certain plots in CCRs were titled in the project’s
startup, due to confusion of the communities’ borderlines, this was quickly put an end
to by improved maps. Furthermore, the authorities followed the intended carpet titling
approach within the private communities; registering and titling all land plots in a
community in one go [Wiig, 2013, p. 108].
The default option was joint titling, and this was also followed through [Wiig, 2013, p.
108]. Several factors contributed to this. First, if an owner of a land plot would like
individual titling instead, the plot was taken out of the process and the dispute had to
be settled in court - both a costly and a socially unattractive procedure - which reduced
the interest of individual titling [Wiig, 2013, p. 108]. Second, the option of postponing
to title the land was not tempting, as it was proposed to cost money to issue titles at a
later stage [Wiig, 2013, 109], as well as making one bear the risk of someone else claiming
the land, or potential structural changes which could prevent all further titling in the
future.
Still, there were land plots which were titled individually. For that the titling process is
to be considered as random, the outcome of the titling - either individual or joint - should
be independent of household characteristics. Therefore, a potential endogeneity problem
could be that less empowered women were put aside by strong husbands, despite the
titling agency’s efforts of inducing joint titling. Nevertheless, bypassed women may still
benefit from a change in the overall gender culture in the community, as the empowered
women may serve as role models for the less empowered ones, in addition to alter men’s
perceptions of the female role in the society [Wiig, 2013, p. 109]. This effect is assumed to
be stronger within than between communities. The sample in this study was deliberately
chosen so the number of joint titles would be high. The figure is 85 % [Wiig, 2013, p.
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109], indicating either that the titling agency in fact was able to enforce joint titling top-
down, or that these areas had a more gender-equal culture. In any case, the estimation
results will be unbiased and valid for districts with similar gender-equal cultures [Wiig,
2013, p. 109].
The reason for claiming that the joint title procedure empowers women is based on
the initial distribution of land between the man and the woman prior to the titling
program. Land acquired during marriage is considered jointly owned, however, land
acquired prior to the marriage, as well as inherited land during marriage, is considered
individually owned [Wiig, 2013, p. 106]. Since men owned considerably more land than
women, joint titling of all land which belonged to the household therefore increased the
women’s relative share of land [Wiig, 2013, p. 104]. The land titling program only sought
to formalize already existing property rights, not to redistribute between households. I
therefore rule out any income effect, since the proportion of land a household owned
remained constant.
On the background of the material presented above, and in line with previous research
on the material, I therefore claim that being a CCR with communal property or a
CP eligible for individual titling was random and independent of characteristics on
community and household level that might affect a woman’s empowerment. The internal
life of the household is not likely to have been affected by community authorities up to
the point where the state started to formalize property rights in the private communities.
Therefore, the difference in the prevalence of domestic abuse between the private and
the recognized communities is solely due to the empowerment impact of joint titling.
Chapter 3
Theory and Literature
In recent years, the literature within development economics has emphasized and shed
light on the position of women and gender as a separate issue demanding attention. The
systematically inferior position of women in many countries, both inside and outside the
household, makes gender an important aspect in economic analysis on the distribution
of welfare. To be able to analyze the division of welfare within the household, it is a
prerequisite to include the interaction between the economic agents who form the unit. In
the first half of this chapter I will present the economic theory of household behaviour
with particular emphasize on gender, to argue for an empowerment effect for women
from the redistribution of land between the spouses. I will then introduce a bargaining
model, which incorporates intimate partner violence, to formally show the effect of the
land distribution on domestic violence. The second half is devoted to empirical research
on resources on household and individual level and its link to domestic violence.
3.1 Modeling Household Behaviour
3.1.1 The Unitary Model
Models on household behaviour are used to explain different outcomes such as marriage
and divorce, demand for goods and services and distribution of welfare within families.
In microeconomic theory, the long established characterization of household behavior
was the unitary model. This model treats the household as if it was a single, decision-
making agent. The persons who form a household are assumed to pool their income and
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maximize a joint utility function subject to the household’s budget constraint [Manser
and Brown, 1980, p. 31].
The two models that laid the theoretical foundation for the unitary approach were
the consensus model by Samuelson [1956] and the altruistic model by Becker [1981].
Both models postulate that it is only the household’s total income which matters for
household demand, that is, the individuals’ specific contributions are irrelevant as long
as total income is left unchanged. Samuelson [1956] assumes separate utility functions
for the individuals, but by consensus within the household will the members agree on a
joint social welfare function. Becker [1981], on the other hand, introduces an altruistic
family member who cares for everyone in the household, and the maximization problem
consists of this member’s utility function, but still subject to the household’s pooled
income.
The unitary model has since the 1980s been criticized from both a theoretical and
an empirical point of view. The two versions of the model presented above, vary in
their perception on how the household’s utility function were formed, but as noted
by Chiappori [1992], do they in both cases circumvent how individual preferences are
aggregated, and how it is decided as to who gets what. Samuelson’s consensus model does
neither specify how the consensus in the household is reached, nor how it is maintained.
Although Becker addresses these issues by introducing the altruistic household member,
the model nevertheless rests on the assumption that the household can be represented
by one individual’s utility function. This is problematic in the sense that we know
households consist of individuals with distinct, and often conflicting preferences [Sen,
1990].
Empirically, the model has also failed to show validity. Numerous studies conducted
in recent years have demonstrated that who earns the money, own the assets or in
other ways contribute to the household, have an impact on the household’s demand for
different goods and services and the distribution of welfare accordingly. In particular,
money in the hands of women is associated with higher spending on education, better
nutritional and health status for the children and increased living conditions for the
household in general [Duflo, 2003], [Gitter and Barham, 2008], [Thomas, 1990]. To
model intra-household behaviour it is thus crucial to go beyond the unitary model.
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3.1.2 A Bargaining Approach
Manser and Brown [1980] and McElroy and Horney [1981] were the first to place the
household decision problem into a bargaining framework, and by this to formally address
intra-household negotiations and distribution. They assume the problem is cooperative
in nature and restrict possible outcomes to those of Pareto optimality. By applying the
Nash bargaining rule on a two-player game, they find an unique solution. This outcome
will depend upon the individuals’ income and assets, market prices and a parameter
representing other factors which influence the individuals’ outside option such as mate
availability, divorce laws, etc [McElroy, 1990, p. 560].
A central prediction of the bargaining model is that the better your option outside
the marriage is, i. e. the higher utility level you can reach if cooperation within the
household breaks down, the higher your threat point for divorce will be, and consequently
the more influence you will have in the household’s decision-making, given that both find
it favourable to continue the relationship [McElroy and Horney, 1981, p.336]. Thus, in
opposition to the unitary model, will a change in the relative share of assets between the
couple alter their respective bargaining power and the household’s demand accordingly.
The distribution of welfare within the family will be more in line with the preferences
of the part with an increased relative share of assets. Applied on the redistribution of
land which occurred in the private communities in Peru, which increased the woman’s
relative share of land in the household, the model predicts that the increment of land
for the woman will improve her fallback position in case of divorce, and her bargaining
position within the household is as a cause of this strengthened.
While Manser and Brown [1980] and McElroy and Horney [1981] operate with divorce as
the ultimate threat, Lundberg and Pollak [1993] present a model where the threat point is
within the household. This non-cooperative outcome will, carried to the extreme, result
in a complete division of labor and responsibilities, i. e. a separate sphere equilibrium
within the family. The outcome of the game will always depend upon the individuals’
threat points. In the extreme case with a corner solution, will the individuals’ relative
shares of the total contribution to the household matter, even when the threat point is
left constant. This is in opposition to both the unitary model and the standard Nash
bargaining model above, where the contributors to the household is irrelevant if the
threat point is left unchanged [Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, p. 92-93] .
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3.1.3 Qualitative Inferences
Although most models of household behaviour do not explicitly address gender issues, I
have shown that the bargaining models can easily accommodate them, and thus provide
a useful approach for analyzing gender relations and the distribution of welfare within
the family. Yet, there are certain limitations one should be aware of, as always, when
trying to describe reality by simplifying it into a model. Sen [Sen, 1990], for instance,
argues that it is seldom the realized value of the individual contribution to the household
that matters, but rather the perception of whom in the household that contributes that
in the end will affect the relative positions within the household.
The value of the contributions to the family may be weighted differently either directly
according to the gender of the provider, or indirectly according to the source, for ex-
ample outside employment versus home-based employment, which is likely to vary by
gender [Sen, 1990]. The women in the private communities have shown to take part
in agriculture decisions to a significantly greater extent than in the recognized peasant
communities [Wiig, 2013], indicating that not only was the wife’s name put on the land
deed, but she is also perceived as owner of the land and naturally takes a more active
role in the decision-making regarding the land. Thus, I argue that the change did not
only happen on paper, but the perception of who contributes to the household was also
altered in favour of the woman, indicated by her increased involvement in agriculture
decisions.
Another qualitative feature to consider is the relative importance of factors which de-
termine options outside marriage [Agarwal, 1997]. In the highlands in Peru, where the
main source of income still is from agriculture, effective command over landed property
will probably be of greater importance for bargaining power than control over any other
asset. The effect of the redistribution of land from the man to the woman in this context
may therefore be substantially, and differ from outcomes elsewhere, where land is less
important for household subsistence.
The joint titling may not only have had a direct effect by changing the relative share
of assets between the spouses and improve their intra-household bargaining power, but
one could easily imagine that these land rights can, over time, help the women moderate
the traditional social norms in the wider social sphere. In this way, the effect of joint
titling does not need to be isolated within the household, but can have outreaching
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consequences for women’s role in other areas in the society, such as in the community
assembly or the market place, which in turn may lead to a multiplicative effect on
intra-household bargaining power.
3.1.4 Incorporating Violence
1The bargaining approaches of both Manser and Brown [1980] and McElroy and Horney
[1981], as well as Sen [1990]’s and Agarwal [1997]’s qualitative inferences, all point in
the same direction, namely that the redistribution of land improved the outside option
for the women in the eligible communities and (substantially) increased their bargaining
power within the household. The bargaining models on domestic violence suggest that
the effect of empowering women reduces the frequency and risk of being abused by their
husbands. By following the noncooperative model in Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1997],
which incorporates violence into the standard bargaining model, I will demonstrate the
empowerment effect of the woman by an increase in her non-income argument.
In economic theory, the decision to remain married is formalized as the situation where
the parties gain more, or equal, by remaining in the relationship than outside. This can
be set up as a strategic relationship where each partner maximizes his or her utility sub-
ject to the constraint that the other part remains in the marriage. If no such equilibrium
exists the relationship will dissolve. Though this may sound quite insensitive, altruism
and love is not ruled out. One partner’s utility may well increase in the other partner’s
utility, and will influence the decision of whether to behave in a way that may harm
one’s spouse. The qualitative results of the model by incorporating feelings will not be
altered, as long as each person values its own utility more than the spouse’s utility.
Consider first the choices facing the man. His utility is assumed to increase in both
consumption and factors which strengthens his self-esteem, power or any other psy-
chological factor which may be found in a violent relationship. In abusive marriages,
violence raises his utility through any of these factors, and his utility function can be
written as; UM = UM (CM , η, S(V )) , where CM is consumption, η denotes marital
capital that offers him utility while married, but lost if single, and S(V ) is the factors
which violence, V , works itself through.
1The theoretical model and its arguments which are presented in this subsection is entirely based on
the work by Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1997].
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The woman’s utility function can be specified as UW = UW (CW , η, V, UM ), where the
two first elements have the same interpretation and implication for her utility as in his,
while the factor V , for violence, will decrease her utility. UM is her husband’s utility.
This is included because a woman’s commitment has shown to play a huge role in violent
relationships. For the woman to continue to stay in the relationship, her utility inside
the marriage, UW , must be least as much as she would obtain outside the marriage, U
W
.
Her participation constraint therefore becomes UW ≥ UW . The external utility depends
upon her consumption, which is a function of her income and other factors that affect
her wealth outside marriage, such as property for instance. When the man maximizes
his utility, her actions are taken as exogenous, and he will choose to secure that her
participation constraint for the marriage is barely satisfied.
The man is able to transfer income to the woman to increase her utility. Her threat
point thus determines the level of violence she will tolerate for a given transfer from her
husband. As her income, or other factors affecting her outside option positively, increase,
her marginal utility, from an additional unit of consumption from her husband, decreases.
The implication is that, as her threat point strengthens, the man’s ability to perform
violence is reduced, and the domestic violence must decline for that she will want to
stay. The lesson from this noncooperative bargaining model is that the women in the
communities where formalization of land took place and their outside option increased
should experience a lower level of violence. The dataset I have from Peru does not go
in depth on the abuse, thus I cannot check whether the level of abuse is lower, only
whether the incidence rate of experiencing such is different.
3.2 Empirical Research
Although increased economic independency from a husband leads to a higher threat
point for the woman, and thus increased bargaining power within the household in the
theoretical model presented above, the reason why a man beats his wife, or rather do not
beat his wife, is naturally more complex than this, and some would even argue for the
opposite mechanism. Mainly four theories within the economic literature try to shed
light on the reason for a husband’s violence against his wife. Below I briefly present
the theories on the cause of domestic abuse in relation to resource availability for the
individuals and the empirical support for these theories.
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3.2.1 Resource Deficiency
Goode argues that force is a resource, just like money, assets, or personal characteristics
[Goode, 1971]. If a man are low on these other resources, he may instead make use
of violence to induce his desired behaviour on his wife. To test the resource hypoth-
esis empirically, the scholars have estimated the effect of the husband’s or the house-
hold’s socioeconomic status, on physical abuse of women. Research in rural Bangladesh
found landholdings to be inversely related to domestic violence [Koenig et al., 2003].
In Colombia, lower socioeconomic status significantly increases the probability of phys-
ical violence for women [Friedemann-Sa´nchez and Lovato´n, 2012]. Another study from
Bangkok, Thailand, which used a combined index of the household’s income, the hus-
band’s education and his occupational achievement, found a lower probability of wife
abuse the higher this socioeconomic index was [Hoffman et al., 1994]. Also research con-
ducted in Egypt and Cambodia found a negative relationship between intimate partner
violence and household wealth, measured from responses to questions about assets and
amenities of the household [Yount, 2005] [Yount and Carrera, 2006].
However, Smith [Smith, 1990], among others, argue that the results from these studies
on resource abundance and its impact on violence in a relationship is also consistent with
stress theory, insofar as low income causes stress which leads to violence. An extensive
study on multiple waves of household surveys from the US on economic stress and the
resource theory in relation to domestic violence found that the risk of violence was
significantly reduced when the debt load of the household was lower and the household’s
income-to-needs ratio was higher [Fox et al., 2002]. The couple’s subjective perception
of their financial situation also had an impact. When either the man or the woman
felt positively about their economic situation, the risk of violence was lower. They
also found, as many others [Friedemann-Sa´nchez and Lovato´n, 2012] [Dalal, 2011], that
unemployment for the male partner increased the risk of violence, as well as when the
man earned a lower share of the couple’s earnings. The two latter factors, an unemployed
man and a man with lower earnings than his wife, are however also consistent with
Goode’s hypothesis of the association between a man’s lack of resources and higher
domestic violence.
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3.2.2 Economic Dependency
The marital dependency theory emphasizes women’s inferior economic situation and
lack of opportunities outside marriage as a determinant for violence to occur in intimate
relationships. Gelles [1976] have investigated the effect of economic empowerment of
American women on their likeliness to remain in a violent relationship. He found a
negative impact of access to resources on the probability of staying with an abusive
partner, just as the bargaining model presented under the theoretical discussion predicts.
The article in Straus et al. [1995, Ch. 21], studied the relationship between a woman’s
economic dependency and the level of abuse with the use of data also derived from
households in the United States. They found that women who were highly dependent on
the marriage tended to experience more physical abuse than women whose dependency
were low. The authors argue that dependent wives have fewer options to the relationship
and less resources within marriage with which to bargain changes in their husband’s
behaviour, thus forcing them to tolerate more abuse.
On the other hand, could there be a difference between subjective and objective depen-
dency on this matter? In the same study they construct an objective dependency index
based on whether the woman works, how much of the relative income of the household
that comes from her and whether they have young children, whereas they measure sub-
jective dependency as her perception of how dependent she is on her husband [Straus
et al., 1995, Ch. 21]. Meanwhile the tendency to tolerate minor violence was signifi-
cantly related to subjective dependency, they found that the reverse was true for severe
violence. The women who tolerated severe violence were significantly more likely to
score high on objective dependency. For the latter women, there is not a question of
negotiating his behaviour or leaving the marriage, as they have no better economic
alternativ.
In rural Bangladesh, economic dependency and its link to domestic violence, have been
studied by looking at micro-credit programs which facilitate group-based saving and
provide credit to women. In [Koenig et al., 2003], the participants in these programs
were found to have a two-thirds lower risk of violence than non-participants. However,
there were also incidences of abuse among participants. Yet another study found no effect
of individual membership in micro-credit programs, but instead that as the percentage
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of women who joined a program increased in the village, the risk of violence was reduced
[Schuler et al., 1996].
The number of children and women’s education level can also affect women’s dependency
on marriage. While more children intuitively raise the dependency of financial support
from the spouse, the higher the education level of the woman, the less dependent should
she be, as her economic alternatives to marriage are higher. In the already mentioned
studies from Egypt and Cambodia, the more children a woman had, the more likely she
was to be abused [Yount, 2005] [Yount and Carrera, 2006]. Most studies also find the
expected relationship between education level and abuse of women [McCloskey et al.,
2005] [Yount and Carrera, 2006] [Yount, 2005]. In general, higher schooling for females
leads to less wife abuse.
3.2.3 Balance of Power
On the other hand, it has been argued that a more economic empowered woman may
lead her husband to feel (more) threatened, which in turn may retaliate by committing
more violence. A study by Yllo and Straus compared gender equality between American
states and found that lower equality was linked to higher wife abuse Straus et al. [1995,
Ch. 22]. However, wives in the top fifth of states where women had the greatest
equality, also suffered from high levels of abuse by their husbands. The reseachers’
explanation was that as the patriarchal social structure and traditional gender roles
break down, some husbands resort to violence in an attempt to retain control and to
protect their threatened positions. Straus and Hotaling have also looked at the link
between gender equality in the society and abuse [Straus and Hotaling, 1980]. They
highlight the importance of the time dimension in this argument. Since men benefit
more from a male-biased system, altering this will be opposed and increase the level of
conflict in the society, but only in the short run.
Women with higher schooling or earnings than their spouses, who are employed while
their husbands are not, or in some other way are more empowered than their spouses
(prefer), may according to this theory be more likely to suffer from (higher level of)
violence. There is for example often found a surprising relationship between employment
status and risk of violence. Several studies report that to be employed is rarely a
protective factor for women against abuse by their husbands [Dalal, 2011], [Panda and
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Agarwal, 2005]. Higher education is, as already mentioned, associated with a reduced
risk of violence. However, also here is a somewhat interesting discovery made. If the
woman has more education than her husband, several studies report the opposite effect
on violence. In Cambodia, women with more education than their husbands had 1,6
times higher odds of experiencing violence in the prior year [Yount and Carrera, 2006].
This relationship was also found in Peru, where the odds were 1,3 higher for women
with more education than their spouses [Flake and Forste, 2006].
In the case of India, Bloch and Rao [2002] argue that, while additional resources allow
women to exit marriages, women who initially came from wealthier families experience
an increased risk of violence. Srinivasan and Bedi [Srinivasan and Bedi, 2007] claim
that the social difficulties, even for Indian women who can support themselves, may
in some cases trump economic factors. A study conducted in Bangladesh similarly
reports that changes in gender norms and availability of income, such as from savings
and credit groups, increase the risk of domestic violence [Koenig et al., 2003], quite
opposite of the intention behind such programs which usually promote themselves as
empowerer of women. A study from Peru on women who were active in grass-root
women’s organizations, found these members to be more likely to experience abuse than
non-members [Gonzales de Olarte and Llosa, 1998]. The authors of the paper suggest
that this could be a consequence of male opposition towards women’s engagement in the
public sphere and a related fear that gender roles are changing.
Then, what about female land ownership and domestic violence? Do a woman empow-
ered through increased ownership of land rely less on her husband which force him to
reduce his violent behaviour so that she will continue to stay, or does her empowerment
induce him to resort to violence as a way of obtaining control and protect his threat-
ened position? There exist only a handful of studies on the subject, but they support
the marital dependency theory, namely that women owning property are less exposed
to violence. In Nicaragua, a study which compared female landowners to female non-
landowners found a significant lower risk of violence in the former group [Grabe, 2010].
The link was not estimated directly, but hypothized to work itself through land own-
ership to gender role ideology, which in turn affects relationship power and ultimately
physical violence. However, the election into the two groups was not random, and may
limit the conclusiveness of the study.
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Another study from Kerala, India, also found a correlation between women owning
immovable property, i. e. land or a house, and lower risk of marital violence [Panda
and Agarwal, 2005]. More specifically, among the propertyless, 49 % had experienced
physical violence, while among those who owned both land and house was the number
7%. Also of interest was the finding that the percentage who left home due to a violent
relationship was much greater among propertied (71%) than among the propertyless
(19%). Hence, ownership of property can serve both as a protective factor and as an
exit option. The same study reports that the level of violence did not differ between
a woman’s employment status, i. e. whether she was regularly employed, seasonally
employed or unemployed, suggesting that land ownership provide a different kind of
security than does employment.
3.2.4 Context Specific Factors
The reason for abusing one’s partner may be multifold. I have touched upon the different
perceptions which emphasize gender roles and the financial situation for the individuals -
either as a man’s lack of resources, a woman’s economic dependency on marriage, or as a
power balance which threatens the man’s traditional role within the household. Results
do vary between papers, both in terms of the different theories empirical significance,
but also how, if at all, they are controlled for.
Vyas and Watts have made the effort of summarizing the existent literature and its find-
ings [Vyas and Watts, 2009]. A household’s assets and women’s higher education were
generally found to be protective factors against violence. Economic development and
poverty reduction were also biased towards having protective impacts. However, they
conclude that context specific factors affect whether financial autonomy is protective or
associated with increased risk of violence. The financial autonomy in their summary is
never measured as the share of property a woman owns, and the argument of context
may thus not be that relevant, but I still wish to consider some factors specific for the
Peruvian Highland.
The way I see it, there are one important aspect which may influence the direction of
the empowerment effect on the risk of being abused for the women in this study. The
culture in the Andes is somewhat different from that of the Latin American continent
in general. As described in Chapter 2, the gender roles in the Highlands are viewed as
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complementary to each other within the agriculture production, rather than one being
subordinated to the other. The man is normally favoured in the heritage of land and the
division of tasks follows traditional gender roles, but the contribution from the woman’s
side to the household is acknowledged and inseparable from other parts of the household’s
economy, and if the man was to migrate, there are no social objections against a woman
performing his tasks. Thus, to increase the female share of land may not oppose social
norms substantially.
Chapter 4
Methodology
4.1 The Dataset
1In 2010 The Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research collected data from
1280 households in Peru. The main objective for collecting the data was to investigate
the effect of joint titling on gender equality within the household. On the background of
this, ten districts were selected from four regions in Peru; Ayacucho, Apurimac, Cuzco
and La Libertad. The selection of districts was made on the basis of the following four
criterions:
• A balance between private and recognized peasant communities within the districts
• High levels of land titling had taken place in the private communities
• More than half of those plots should be titled jointly
• Main activity in the community is agriculture
To be able to evaluate the effect of the formalization of land, the second and the third
criterion are self-explanatory. In addition, the districts where there were a balance
between CCR and CP were attractive. The reason being that cultural similarities are
likely to be higher within a district, and by claiming that the process which assigned
the communities to different legal status was random, there should be no particular
1All the information on the dataset and the survey procedure in this section is from the NIBR working
paper on the methodology of the household survey [Wiig, 2012]
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differences between communities within the same district other than their legal status.
The last criterion excluded high-altitude, pasture-based communities as they probably
rely more on collective action in managing pastures and rotation agriculture.
After the selection of districts, four CCR and four CP communities within each district
were chosen, and then randomly 20 households within each of these communities. Only
households with a principle couple consisting of one man and one woman were eligible
for selection, thus excluding single-headed households and couples of the same sex. The
term ‘principle couple’ refers to a couple that is emotionally attached and who has the
main responsibility when it comes to the household’s economy and decision-making. The
man and the woman were interviewed together, but also separately in an attempt to
reveal truthful information regarding sensitive subjects such as that of domestic violence.
In addition, the president in the different communities, or another key informant, was
questioned about various gender and organizational features of the community. The
data is thus not representative for Peru as a whole, but for the subset of districts that
fulfill the four criterions outlined above. Summary statistics for various characteristics
on individual, household and community level are presented below for the two types of
communities.
There are no particular large or systematic differences, although some characteristics
differ between the private and recognized communities. Since I claim that the process of
being elected into either group was random, my expectation is that there should be no
significant statistical differences between characteristics describing the individuals and
households in the two samples. A small sample and/or lack of variation can however
preclude this. There are for instance only 1,4% of the women in the sample who have
higher education, and thus only natural that the observed variance may vary slightly
by community type. To formally check the differences I used a simple t-test designed to
compare means of the same variable between two groups. The t-test’s null hypothesis
is that the means are equal and the chosen significance level will be the likelihood of
rejecting the null hypothesis although it is true [Hill et al., 2008, p. 151]. The results of
t-tests can be found in Appendix A.
On a 1% significance level, I find that the mean education level of the man is significantly
different in the two types of communities, as well as the number of social programs
present and whether women have had leading positions in the community the last 5 years.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics by community type
CCR CP
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age of woman, # years 43,30 14,33 45,22 14,66
Age of man, # years 46,52 14,32 48,55 14,89
Age difference less than 10 years, dummy 0,89 0,32 0,90 0,29
Cohabitating, # years 22,57 13,85 24,54 14,32
Married, dummy 0,60 0,49 0,66 0,47
Children, # 2,38 1,79 2,10 1,62
Woman born in community, dummy 0,66 0,48 0,69 0,46
Education level woman, level 2,11 1,16 2,28 1,33
Education level man, level 2,77 1,39 3,00 1,48
Man can read, woman cannot, dummy 0,23 0,42 0,24 0,43
Woman speaks native language, dummy 0,74 0,44 0,73 0,44
Catholic, dummy 0,64 0,48 0,68 0,47
Protestant, dummy 0,28 0,45 0,25 0,44
Man’s income larger, dummy 0,64 0,48 0,63 0,48
Wealth group low, dummy 0,34 0,47 0,31 0,46
Wealth group medium, dummy 0.33 0,47 0,31 0,46
Wealth group high, dummy 0,33 0,47 0,37 0,48
Social programs, # 4,49 1,28 5,70 1,28
Distance from district capital by foot, # minutes 127,29 97,60 92,34 72,72
Access by asphalt road, dummy 0,04 0,19 0,18 0,38
Women in leading positions last 5 years, dummy 0,30 0,46 0,15 0,36
Original land before 1970s, dummy 0,31 0,46 0,12 0,33
Hacienda land before 1970s, dummy 0,65 0,48 0,65 0,48
Fundo land before 1970s, dummy 0,15 0,36 0,9 0,29
Ayacucho, dummy 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,44
Apurimac, dummy 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,43
Cusco, dummy 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,43
La Libertad, dummy 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,43
Number of households 635 645
There are also differences in the distance to the district capital, whether the community
is accessed by asphalt road and in what type of land that existed in the communities
prior to the reform in the 1970s. On a significance level of 5%, the woman’s and man’s
age is found to be significantly different in the two types of communities, in addition
to the number of years they have been living together and whether they are married or
cohabitating. The mean education level for women is also significantly different on a 5
% significance level.
Although the characteristics presented above are expected to have an impact on the
likelihood of experiencing domestic abuse, the observed differences in the means are
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first of all unlikely to have its origin in something which is qualitatively different in the
two types of communities, and especially not something which influences the prevalence
of domestic abuse. Secondly, the differences are, although significant, very small and
their effect on abuse are not biased to one side. While they have more education in
the private communities, something which usually is associated with lower levels of
abuse, fewer women have had leading positions in the private communities, which point
the probability of being physically abused in the opposite direction. The rest of the
characteristics that differ between the community types cannot be argued a priori to
have a determined effect in either way on domestic abuse.
On the background of this, and what we know about the random assignment of commu-
nity type in the 1970s, I will argue that the differences in the variables are unlikely to be
due to an underlying variable correlated with domestic violence that is different between
the two community types. Furthermore, the characteristics presented above will all be
included as variables in my model, so the minor differences are something which I, after
all, control for.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
During the separate interviews each woman was asked if she had ever been physically
abused. The dependent variable is thus constructed as a dummy variable, taking the
value 1 if the woman answered confirmatively to the question, and 0 if not. Only for
one of these 1280 women that were asked is the observation missing. The answers are
summarized below and show that 375 of the 1279 women who answered the question
reported ever being physically abused, i. e. 29 % of the women in the sample.
Table 4.2: Overview of abuse by community type
Abused
Yes No Total
Private community (CP) 177 468 645
Peasant community (CCR) 198 436 634
Total 375 904 1,279
The prevalence of violence is considerably lower in this sample than what the WHO
reported in their recent survey from Peru mentioned in Chapter 2 [Garc´ıa-Moreno et al.,
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2005]. However, it is important to remember that the selection of this sample not was
completely random, but based on certain criteria. For example it is hypothesized that
households which belong to a lower socioeconomic class have a higher prevalence of
violence. Since this study only considers households which possess some land, it per
se exclude households in lower socioeconomic classes, and it is therefore intuitive that
the reported figure on violence is lower in this sample. Also, as the household survey
not primarily was conducted to gather information regarding domestic violence, the
interviewers were probably less trained in these issues as the ones from the WHO were,
and the underreporting may on this ground be somewhat higher in this sample. Yet, the
potential underreporting is not a serious problem, as there is nothing which indicates
that it should be different between the two types of communities.
Since the dependent variable only can take on two values, most econometric textbooks
will argue that a linear regression model will be an inappropriate method, and that
nonlinear models such as a logit or a probit model will suit better, for example Hill
et al. [2008] and Kennedy [2003]. Their argument is based on the fact that there is
nothing that limits the outcome of the dependent variable, i. e. its probability value, to
be confined within the boundary of [0,1] [Hill et al., 2008, p. 420]. The underlying feature
that causes this problem is that the linear probability model implicitly assumes that an
increase in one of the independent variables have a constant effect on the probability of
the outcome of the dependent variable [Hill et al., 2008, p. 421]. In the logit or probit
model, the marginal effect of a change in one of the explanatory variables will however
varies, depending on each person’s original probability. The marginal effect is smaller
the closer a person is to the boundaries [Hill et al., 2008, p. 421]. If many observations
in my sample have extreme values, a nonlinear model will accordingly fit the data better
than a linear model. On the background of this, I choose to make use of a logit model
in my analysis. However, the difference between a logit and a probit model tends to be
very small[Hill et al., 2008, p. 425].
When that is said, Angrist and Pischke [2008] will argue that when the aim is to make
causal inference, it is less problematic to use OLS. As one have to compute marginal
effects of the logit regression to say something meaningful anyway, they postulate that
the coefficients from the OLS regression will not differ greatly from these marginal ef-
fects, at least not for the common and non-extreme values of the covariates [Angrist
and Pischke, 2008, p. 107]. Moreover, OLS might be preferred instead of choosing a
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random non-linear model. Therefore, in Appendix B I have included the OLS estima-
tion of the model. By comparing these estimates with the ones I present in Chapter
5, you can indeed see that the estimated impact of the independent variables on the
dependent variable is quite similar. The standard errors do not differ much either, thus
the coefficients that were significant under the logit approach maintain their same level
of significance under OLS.
4.3 Identification Strategy
The causal relationship of interest is the effect of the redistribution land on domestic
violence against women. To identify this, I will use a dummy for whether the community
was eligible for formalizing of property rights, taking the value 1 if yes, and 0 if the
community already was recognized as a peasant community. As already argued, the
assignment of community type was random, hence eliminating potential selection bias,
since random assignment makes the treatment independent of potential outcomes. The
dummy for being a private community will therefore capture the average causal effect
of the joint land titling.
In addition, I include a number of other independent variables. These have two impor-
tant functions in a regression analysis of experimental data when examining a treatment
effect. First of all, the inclusion reduces the likelihood that the effect of the treatment
variable is contaminated by other things not controlled for [Hill et al., 2008, p. 150].
Secondly, by including characteristics that is not correlated with the treatment variable,
but which may explain some of the variance in the dependent variable, it will generate
a more precise estimate of the treatment variable, i. e. lowering its standard error [Hill
et al., 2008, p. 151].
4.3.1 Variables on the Household and Individual Level
The covariates of this model can be divided into two sub-categories; characteristics of
the community and that of the individuals and households. The variables on individual
and household level are:
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• Length of co-habitation: for a woman, the most common person to be abused by
is her husband [World Health Organization, 2013]. The length of cohabitation is
thus likely to have a positive effect on domestic violence as the woman has been
at risk of being abused by her husband for a longer time.
• Age of the woman
• Age of the man
• Age difference: a dummy for whether the age difference between the man and the
woman is less than 10 years. Captures possible power imbalance.
• Married: a dummy for whether the couple is officially married or only cohabitating.
The sign of this is not a priori obvious, though there is evidence that cohabitating
couples are more likely to be violent than married couples [Brownridge and Halli,
2000]. A marriage may be perceived as more stable and permanent, which in a
male-dominated society like Peru, may reduce the men’s need to control their part-
ner. On the other hand, a marriage is more difficult to dissolve, which may make
it harder for the women to negotiate living conditions or to exit the relationship.
• Number of children: higher marital capital, such as children, increases the value
of the relationship and reduces the likelihood of leaving a partner. Although a
relationship-specific investment might give both partners higher utility and incen-
tives to continue the relationship, it does not necessarily imply lower violence.
Whether such an investment increases or reduces the abuse will rely on the rela-
tive value of the investment to each of them and how it affects the man’s marginal
utility of violence [Tauchen et al., 1991].
• Woman’s education level: education affects a person’s labour market opportunities,
and thereby bargaining power and/or perhaps the capability of bargaining, which
may affect the likelihood of experiencing physical abuse.
• Man’s education level: greater education may provide men with more cognitive
tools to negotiate and thus be more prone to a dialogue approach rather than a
physical approach to solve conflicts.
• Education difference: a dummy for whether the man can read or write while the
woman cannot. Captures possible power imbalance.
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• Woman only speaks native language
• Live in community where the woman was born: a dummy for whether the house-
hold lives close to the woman’s family and original social network. If the woman
has a larger social network it may affect her ability to seek help or shelter, which
in turn may have a negative influence on the risk of being abused.
• Christian
• Catholic
• Wealth groups: the sample is divided into three groups: low, medium and high
wealth households, measured as the value of land they own. Some of the arguments
from the theoretical and empirical part of the literature on domestic violence claim
that a man’s socioeconomic status or economic stress is an important determinant
of conflict level and abuse in a household. The poorest tertile of households were
placed in the poor wealth group, the richest tertile form the high wealth group
and the remaining tertile make up the medium wealth group. By far, the most
common form of obtaining land is through heritage [Deere, 2005, p. 49]. I will thus
argue that the land a person owns may be considered as exogenously given and
very unlikely to be affected by personal characteristics which also could determine
the likelihood of experiencing domestic abuse.
• Income difference: a dummy for whether the man earns more than the woman.
Captures possible power imbalance. If the coefficient of this is positive, it supports
the theoretical and empirical discussion in the previous chapter where it was argued
that relative economic power influences the possibility to perform violence.
4.3.2 Variables on the Community Level
The variables measuring community characteristics are:
• Private community: a dummy for whether the community is private, as opposed
to a recognized peasant community. This is my main variable of interest. As
discussed in the previous chapter, lower economic dependency may actually affect
the risk and level of abuse in either direction, as it not only empowers women,
but also may threaten the man’s traditional role as the breadwinner. The sign of
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this is thus not a priori obvious, although the limited studies that do exist on the
subject suggest a negative impact of female land ownership on the level of abuse.
It was also argued that although reduced dependency may increase violence in the
short run, it is likely to be lower in the longer run. The formalization of property
rights was initiated in 1994, and was considered done in the very beginning of the
21st century. Some years have thus passed, and the possible higher conflict level
the process initiated, may thus have been reduced or completely eliminated, if ever
increased to begin with.
• Number of social programs in the community: the presence of social programs
could affect the likeliness of being abused. They may serve as physical shelters or
represent a higher degree of social network ties, or if the programs in particular
work with gender related issues, they may strengthen the female position in the
communities, and thereby affect the likelihood of experiencing violence through
perceptions of the female role.
• Women have had any leading positions in the community: dummy for whether a
woman has been communal president, leader of the auto-defense group, a peace
judge or governor lieutenant the last 5 years. If the dummy takes the value 1, the
taboo of women as leaders and the perception of the woman as something one can
dominate, are likely to be reduced, and thus affect the general view on the female
position in the society, which in turn may trickle down to the household level.
• Community accessed by asphalt road
• Distance to district capital by minutes of walking
• Ayacucho
• Apurimac
• Cusco
• Hacienda land prior to the 1970s
• Fundo land prior to the 1970s
• Original land prior to the 1970s
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4.4 The Model
2The relationship of interest can formally be represented as
y∗i = α+ γ · CP +
∑K
j=1 βj ·Xi,j + εi, i = 1, . . . , 1279
where y∗i identifies the propensity for a women with a certain set of characteristics to
be physically beaten. While this propensity is unobservable, I assume it depends on the
variables on the right-hand side of the equation. Xi,j is a vector representing the K
control variables on individual, household and community level which were elaborated
in the previous section, while CP, the variable of interest, is the dummy for whether the
community was eligible for formalization of property rights and γ its associated effect on
the probability of being abused. All of the factors on the right-hand side are observable
except the error term, εi.
Although we would like to model y∗i - the propensity to be abused - this is not possible.
However, what we do know is whether a woman is physically abused or not, and the
estimation of the probability of whether this is the case is feasible, i. e. estimating
the probability that the woman is physically abused given the values of Xi,j and CP
- formally written as Prob[yi = 1|Xi,j , CP ]. The individual is observed to be beaten
when the propensity y∗i crosses a certain threshold c, and the dependent variable is then
recorded as 1.
As mentioned earlier, to estimate the model by running an OLS regression will not
restrict the outcome to lie between 0 and 1. We therefore need a function which is
confined within these two values to avoid contradicting basic mathematic logic. Any
continuous probability distribution function F (Xβ) will in fact do the work. The cumu-
lative function for a logit model is the logistic distribution function, so that Prob[yi =
1|Xi,j , CP ] = Prob(y∗i > c) = F (Xβ) = logit(Xβ) = exp(Xβ)1+exp(Xβ) .
After having estimated the model, each of the chosen control variables will be given a
value. The sign of this value will tell us the direction of the relationship between that
particular variable and the dependent variable, but as discussed under a previous section,
it will not directly show the change in the probability of the dependent variable of a
change in one of the independent variables, as is the case with the coefficients to a linear
2The theory in this section is based on its whole on Kennedy [2003, Ch. 16].
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model. By taking the partial derivative with respect to one of the independent variables
when dealing with a logit model, the answer will be a function of both the estimated
coefficient and the values of the independent variables. Formally, the marginal effect of
a logit model can be written as δYδXi,j =
F (Xβ)
δXi,j
= βjf(Xβ) = βj [
exp(Xβ)
1+exp(Xβ) ], where f(.) is
the probability distribution function of the F (.) distribution.
The partial derivative of a particular dependent variable in the linear models is constant
for all values of the dependent variable, but by looking at the mathematical expression
above this is obviously not the case for non-linear models, though it is still possible
to determine the direction of the effect from βj as f(.) is always positive. To find the
marginal effects of the explanatory variables one has to decide at which point of the
distribution one want to compute them on. The most common choices are either to
estimate the marginal effect at the mean of the independent variables, or to find the
effect of the independent variables for each observation and then take the average. I
chose the latter procedure.
One of regression analysis’ most serious problems is omitted variables bias. This happens
if the specified model leaves out one or more important causal factors which is both
assumed to have an impact on the dependent variable and is correlated with one or
more of the included independent variables. This will affect the estimates of the other
independent variables in the model by either over- or underestimating their effect as
to compensate for the missing factor(s), i. e. it will bias the estimates of the other
parameters, or to put it in other words, it will lead to an endogeneity problem, as the
omitted variable(s) will be absorbed into the error term.
In a classical regression equation the estimated coefficients are little affected by omitted
variable problems; as long as the omitted variables are orthogonal to the variables that
are included, their estimates will still be consistent and unbiased, and the only drawback
is an increase of the residual variance and hence higher standard errors [Cramer, 2007].
However, to use a logit model is more problematic in the sense that even if there is
an omitted variable which is uncorrelated with any of the other regressors, it will still
bias the estimates of the other regressors and lead to unobserved heterogeneity [Cramer,
2007]. In the social sciences, the set of explanatory variables is seldom complete, and
thus omitted variable bias and unobserved heterogeneity are almost prerequisites. In
the seminal paper by Cramer [2007] it is shown that although the coefficient in a logit
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model may be biased due to omitted variables, the partial effect of the regressors on the
outcome is not. Since the aim of this study is causal inference, I do not consider this
type of unobserved heterogeneity as an important issue.
However, if there exist unobserved factors which have an influence on both the depen-
dent variable and one or more of the variables I assume are independent, is a completely
different matter. Then the estimated marginal effects no longer represent causal effects.
To correct for this one either has to have panel data or one or more instruments which are
correlated with the endogenous variable(s) on the right hand side, but assumed exoge-
nous to the independent variable. Since my sample is cross-section, it is not possible to
control for individual effects by either the random or fixed effect method as is customary
with panel data. One factor which is commonly discussed with regards to this issue is a
person’s ”ability” or personal characteristics. This is unlikely to influence variables on
the community level such as the number of social programs or whether the community is
accessed by asphalt road, however, one never knows if inherited characteristics may have
influenced for example whether the woman is married or only speaks a native language.
Therefore, the result of my estimation only holds if there is nothing which both affects
whether a woman is beaten by her husband and any of the explanatory variables I have
included on the right hand side.
Estimation of the logit model is done by maximum likelihood estimation, i. e. choosing
values for the coefficients of the independent variables that maximizes the probability
of observing the sample. In a large sample the maximum likelihood estimator is asymp-
totically unbiased and efficient and it is consistent [Kennedy, 2003, p. 22]. It is only
possible to solve the model by this procedure by using statistical software.
Chapter 5
Results
I estimated the model, presented in Chapter 4, by using the statistical software package
STATA 13. The ordinary output from a logistic regression returns you the direction of
the effect of the covariates on the dependent variable, but to otherwise say something
meaningful about their effect, it is necessary to convert the results into odds ratio or
marginal effects. I present the results in terms of marginal effects computed as the aver-
age impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable for each observation,
i. e. the average marginal effect (AME).
The result of the adjusted predictions of the regression is listed in table 5.1, and it shows
that the impact of belonging to a private community on the prevalence of domestic abuse
is significantly different from zero on a 1% significance level. Put in other words, the
p-value of the coefficient is lower than 0,01, which implies that the there is less than 1%
chance of observing such an extreme value by chance. To live in a private community is
associated with a 7,9% lower probability of ever having been physically abused. That is,
where women have been empowered through greater ownership of land, and thus have
a higher threat point, there is less abuse. Based on the discussion in Section 3.2, the
economic literature on domestic violence is not a priori to make the association between
higher economic independency in general and lower domestic abuse, but the limited
studies on female land ownership and prevalence of violence show a negative impact of
land ownership on spousal abuse, and my result complies with the latter.
Furthermore, the result of the regression supports Goode’s hypothesis and economic
stress theory which both argue that there is more violence in households which belong
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to a lower socioeconomic class. The effect of belonging to the medium wealth group
reduces the probability of being abused by 5,6% compared to the low wealth group, while
belonging to the high wealth group reduces the likelihood by 6,2%. Both significant at
a 10% level.
Table 5.1: Probability of being physically abused, logistic regression model
Variable AME SE
Private community, dummy -0,0791563 *** 0,0271296
Age of woman, # years -0,0026258 0,00311
Age of man, # years -0,0013695 0,0032507
Age difference less than 10 years, dummy -0,0382619 0,0521364
Cohabitating, # years 0,0074957 *** 0,0022024
Married, dummy -0,0329057 0,0299022
Children, # 0,0591751 0, 0391041
Woman born in community, dummy -0,0259794 0,0262855
Education level woman, level -0,0015088 0,0154092
Education level man, level 0,0120785 0,0111899
Man can read, woman cannot, dummy 0,0500201 0,0339678
Woman speaks native language, dummy 0,1181837 0,1205377
Catholic, dummy 0,0499807 0,0349365
Protestant, dummy 0,0324994 0,0352912
Man’s income larger, dummy 0,0521375 * 0,0270249
Wealth group medium, dummy -0,0555629 * 0,0306259
Wealth group high, dummy -0,0620309 * 0,0318302
Social programs, # 0,0084858 0,0139442
Distance district capital by foot, #minutes -0,0000597 0,0001617
Access by asphalt road, dummy 0,0525575 0,0428648
Women leading positions last 5 years, dummy -0,0864213 ** 0,0332019
Original land before 1970s, dummy -0,0880414 ** 0,0403475
Hacienda land before 1970s, dummy -0,0784446 ** 0,0337254
Fundo land before 1970s, dummy -0,0514352 0,0413864
Ayacucho, dummy 0,1401441 0,1263748
Apurimac, dummy 0,1586121 0,1282147
Cusco, dummy 0,3249241 ** 0,1336391
N 1279
Pseudo R2 0,1143
LR chi2(27) 176,94
Prob >chi2 0,0000
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
AME = Average Marginal Effect
SE = Standard Error
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The positive coefficient for the dummy representing the man earning the higher income,
is in line with bargaining theory on domestic violence presented in Section 3.1.4. In
households where the man earns more than the woman, which is the case in 63% of the
households, the woman has a 5,2% increased probability of having been maltreated by
her husband compared to the situation where they earn the same, or the woman has a
higher income than her spouse. When the man earns equal to or less than her, she has
a higher threat point than if the opposite is the case. She is then in a better position to
negotiate a more favourable situation for herself, or equivalently the man is less capable
of committing violence, as this reduces her utility, and thereby the chance that she will
remain in the marriage.
The age variables are both insignificant. This may come as a surprise as being older
implies that one has lived longer, and hence has been exposed to the risk of being abused
over a longer time interval. On the other hand, since physical abuse is most common
between intimate partners, it should not matter how old you are, but how long you have
been in a relationship. The variable representing how long the couple has lived together,
is significant at a level of 1%. One additional year of cohabitating, increases the risk of
being abused by 0,7%, everything else held constant.
When considering how to incorporate the women’s education into the model, I had sev-
eral choices; her math competence, whether she can read or write, if she speaks Spanish
in addition to her native language and her level of education. However, none of these
showed any significance on the likelihood of being abused, and may come as a surprise,
as the effect of education on domestic violence is one of the factors there is consensus on
affects violence negatively [Vyas and Watts, 2009]. One explanation may be the sam-
ple in itself. It is based on households which own land and live in communities where
agriculture is the main income source. The effect of education elsewhere is often not
significant until a certain level [Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011], and with only 1,4% of the
women in the sample having higher education, this may explain the lack of significance.
The coefficient of the dummy for whether the man can read, while the woman cannot,
had the expected positive sign, but was barely insignificant at a 10% level.
Marital capital was not found to matter for the likelihood of being abused in this sam-
ple. The dummy for whether or not the couple is married or only cohabitating is not
significant, and neither is the number of children. Furthermore, whether or not the
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couple lived in the community where the woman was born was not found important in
explaining the likelihood of being abused. This variable, together with the number of
social programs in the community, were included to capture the hypothesized effect of
the opportunity to seek shelter or help within the community of residence. On the other
hand, these variables could be more relevant for the level, or intensity of abuse. The so-
cial programs are everything from conditional cash transfer to the women upon sending
their children to school to family planning and literacy training, and could therefore be
argued to represent an empowerment effect of women as well. The coefficient, however,
was not significant.
In 22% of the communities, women had leading positions the last 5 years. From the
regression output, we can observe that this is associated with a lower probability of
being abused. The inclusion of this variable was meant to capture a general perception
of women in the communities which could trickle down to the household level and affect
domestic violence. According to the result, this is also the case - women who live in
these communities have a 8,6% lower probability of having ever experienced domestic
violence.
Communication to a more urban center does not seem to play a role, both measured
as distant to district capital by foot and whether the community is accessed by asphalt
road. On the other hand, I have argued that it only reflects the degree of rurality, and its
insignificance is therefore not that surprising. I also included dummies for three of the
regions to reflect possible local differences between the four districts. The dummy for the
district of Cusco is positive and significant. To live there makes the probability that the
woman has experienced abuse a daunting 35% higher compared to the reference region
La Libertad. Unfortunately, I have not been able to find anything in the anthropological
literature which could explain this finding from Cusco.
Whether the woman speaks a native language or not, did not have a significant impact
on the likelihood of experiencing abuse. Thus, it does not seem that indigenous women
are more marginalized and prone to abusive behaviour by their husbands than others.
The dummies for religion were also insignificant. However, it seems to matter what kind
of land that existed in the community prior to the land reform in the 1970s. If the
land was formerly owned by a hacienda or belonged to an original community, it seems
to reduce the likelihood of abuse. These dummies confirm that the communities were
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affected by different cultures prior to the 1970s and which continued to exist even after
their deformalization.
Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
In this thesis I have examined whether female ownership of land affects the prevalence
of physical violence against women. Until recently, research on domestic abuse has
been focused on Western countries. Furthermore, studies conducted on the link between
female land ownership and the level of domestic abuse has, to my knowledge, only made
use of non-experimental data, and their findings may be nothing more than a spurious
correlation. This thesis thus stands out for two reasons; the data is from a non-Western
country, and it makes us of an exogenous change in land distribution between man
and woman in certain Peruvian communities, which resembles a natural experiment, to
test the causal effect of female land holdings on the likelihood to experience domestic
violence.
The result of my econometric analysis suggests that the impact of the marginal effect
of joint land titling on women in the Peruvian Highland led to lower prevalence of
domestic abuse. In fact, the probability of ever having been physically abused was 7,9%
lower in the communities were women had received an increased share of land. Both
reduction of gender-based violence and an increased share of female land owners are part
of the UN’s platform for action to strengthen gender equality and to reduce poverty.
The interpretation of my result, I argue, is that these two strategies are interrelated -
empowering women through greater ownership of land may reduce domestic abuse.
Higher economic independency for women is not a priori associated with lower levels of
violence within the empirical strand of research on domestic abuse, as increased economic
independency for women may oppose the perception of the man as the household’s
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breadwinner. The limited studies on the effect of land ownership suggests, however, that
females who own land experience lower levels of abuse, as shown in Panda and Agarwal
[2005] and Grabe [2010]. On the other hand, the level of spousal abuse in Panda and
Agarwal [2005] did not differ between a woman’s employment status, i. e. whether
she was regularly employed, seasonally employed or unemployed, suggesting that land
ownership provide a different kind of security than does employment. Furthermore, as
the amount of land the household possessed did not change, my study indicates that
there is a substantial difference between women’s access to land, and rights to land, as
Deere and Leon [2001] has argued before me.
Even though my results are indicative of a causal effect of land ownership on domestic
abuse, more research is needed to investigate the external validity of the effects found
in this study. Wiig [2013] argue that the empowerment effect of the joint titling of land
probably has limited external validity for less gender-equal cultures. In particular, as the
man and the woman are viewed as complementary to each other within the household’s
agricultural production in the Peruvian Highland, this may explain why the top-down
enforcement of joint titles did not induce a higher conflict level and subsequently more
violence. That said, it could also be due to the Peruvian history of dictators, which may
have induced the population to silently comply orders from the State. In Colombia, a
similar process of land restitution and formalization is at the door step, with joint titling
as the overarching principle. The Norwegian Institute of Urban and Regional Studies,
which conducted the Peruvian household survey, is also to be engaged in this process,
and it will be interesting to see whether one could find any effect there, as Colombia is
a considerably more male-dominated society.
The dataset only allowed me to look at whether or not the woman had been physically
abused by her husband, and not the level of abuse. The effect of joint titles on land
between the man and the woman may thus have been more substantial than what this
dataset was able to capture. Thus, to strengthen the result of this study, it would be
interesting to conduct a new household survey in Peru which also details the level of
the abuse. Finally, Peruvian parents still prefer to transfer land to their sons rather
than their daughters, and the partner’s name will not automatically be added on the
title deed, suggesting that the empowerment gain through the land titling process in
this generation may be lost in the next [Wiig, 2013]. As the proportion of ever-married
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women who report spousal violence in Peru is extensive, the Peruvian government should
be interested in strategies which reduce the occurrence of violence against their women.
I have found a causal effect of female land ownership on violence against women. More
research is needed to establish whether this causal link also is present in other countries
and cultures - under different conditions. If this is the case, then one strategy to reduce
the extensive abuse of women can be to reverse the unequal distribution of land between
men and women. Furthermore, as in the case of Peru in particular, research on how to
maintain increased equality in land distribution between genders is also of great concern.
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Appendix A
Table 1: Sample descriptives using t-test for equality of means
CCR CP
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-test
Age of woman 43,30 14,33 45,22 14,66 -2.3619 **
Age of man 46,52 14,32 48,55 14,89 -2.4842 **
Age difference small 0,89 0,32 0,90 0,29 -1.0082
Years of cohabitating 22,57 13,85 24,54 14,32 -2.5007 **
Married 0,60 0,49 0,66 0,47 -2.1858 **
Children 2,38 1,79 2,10 1,62 1.8702
Woman born in community 0,66 0,48 0,69 0,46 -1.2068
Education level woman 2,11 1,16 2,28 1,33 -2.5259 **
Education level man 2,77 1,39 3,00 1,48 -2.8254 ***
Man can read, woman cannot 0,23 0,42 0,24 0,43 -0.5027
Woman speaks native language 0,74 0,44 0,73 0,44 0.2142
Catholic 0,64 0,48 0,68 0,47 -1.3222
Protestant 0,28 0,45 0,25 0,44 0.9900
Man’s income larger 0,64 0,48 0,63 0,48 0.4839
Wealth group low 0,34 0,47 0,31 0,46 1.0284
Wealth group medium 0.33 0,47 0,31 0,46 0.7904
Wealth group high 0,33 0,47 0,37 0,48 -1.7882
Social programs 4,49 1,28 5,70 1,28 -2.9021 ***
Distance from district capital 127,29 97,60 92,34 72,72 7.2724 ***
Access by asphalt road 0,04 0,19 0,18 0,38 -8.1607 ***
Women in leading positions 0,30 0,46 0,15 0,36 6.5603 ***
Original land before 1970s 0,31 0,46 0,12 0,33 8.1720 ***
Hacienda land before 1970s 0,65 0,48 0,65 0,48 -0.3221
Fundo land before 1970s 0,15 0,36 0,9 0,29 3.3024 ***
Ayacucho 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,44 -0.4183
Apurimac 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,43 0.1613
Cusco 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,43 0.0963
La Libertad 0,25 0,43 0,25 0,43 0.1613
Number of households 635 645
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 2: Probability of being physically abused, OLS regression model
Variable Coefficient Stand. Err.
Private community, dummy -0,0796301 *** 0,0275164
Age of woman, # years -0,0025975 0,0030461
Age of man, # years -0,0009142 0,0031402
Age difference less than 10 years, dummy -0,0339751 0,0527927
Cohabitating, # years 0,0068223 *** 0,0021005
Married, dummy -0,0314771 0,0295621
Children, # 0,0550148 0,0385709
Woman born in community, dummy -0,0283448 0,0266960
Education level woman, level -0,0009941 0,0155069
Education level man, level 0,0101891 0,0113778
Man can read, woman cannot, dummy 0,0537242 0,0351352
Woman speaks native language, dummy 0,1132946 0,1097826
Catholic, dummy 0,0441172 0,0332594
Protestant, dummy 0,0277207 0,0345299
Man’s income larger, dummy 0,0557992 * 0,0290038
Wealth group medium, dummy -0,0574890 * 0,0308799
Wealth group high, dummy -0,0602833 * 0,0323347
Social programs, # 0,0092362 0,0143488
Distance district capital by foot, #minutes -0,0000576 0,0001581
Access by asphalt road, dummy 0,0476008 0,0446511
Women leading positions last 5 years, dummy -0,0818767 ** 0,0323523
Original land before 1970s, dummy -0,0859441 ** 0,0398680
Hacienda land before 1970s, dummy -0,0776521 ** 0,0318458
Fundo land before 1970s, dummy -0,0435828 0,0399666
Ayacucho, dummy 0,1000258 0,1140648
Apurimac, dummy 0,1232552 0,1158767
Cusco, dummy 0,3318012 *** 0,1242923
N 1279
R2 0,1294
F (27, 1251) 6,89
Prob >F 0,0000
Root MSE 0,42949
* p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
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